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Choosing Futures: Alva Myrdal and the Construction
of Swedish Futures Studies, 1967–1972
J enny Ander s son
Summary: This article discusses the Swedish discourse on futures studies in the late
1960s and early 1970s. It focuses on the futures discourse of the group appointed by
the Prime Minister, Olof Palme, in 1967 under the chairmanship of Alva Myrdal.
The Swedish futures discourse focused on futures studies as a democratic means of
reform in defence of the Swedish model and ‘‘Swedish’’ values of solidarity and
equality, in opposition to an international futurology dominated by the Cold War
and dystopic narratives of global disaster. The article suggests that the creation of
Swedish futures studies, culminating in a Swedish institute for futures studies, can
be seen as a highpoint of postwar planning and the Swedish belief in the possibility
of constructing a particularly Swedish future from a particularly Swedish past.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In 1971, the Swedish Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic
Party (Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti, SAP), Olof Palme, appointed a
group chaired by Alva Myrdal – feminist, social policy researcher,
ambassador, minister, and eventually, in 1982, Nobel Peace Prize laureate1
– to study the future. In the early 1970s, Alva Myrdal was well-known
through her work on disarmament and world peace, as well as, in the
Swedish political context, her radical equality programme for the SAP in
1969. The equality programme was an ambitious attempt to relate social
democratic ideology to the critique of the late 1960s and to rethink the
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concept of equality for the future; but it clashed with party ideology and
left Alva Myrdal disappointed and embittered with party orthodoxy.2
By the late 1960s, the future had become a deeply troubling sphere. The
feeling that characterized the 1950s and early 1960s – that one was
standing on the threshold of a future soon to be brought about by
technological wonder and economic expansion – had evaporated.
Progress, particularly in its postwar conceptualization as economic
growth, had led to the exhaustion of natural resources, new social
problems in a competitive society, and a widening gulf between a
developed and a developing world.3 Technology no longer seemed to
offer a better future; technological advances actually made even the worst
conceivable scenarios seem like a perfectly logical extension of the present,
a conception expressed in metaphors such as ‘‘megadeaths’’, ‘‘mutually
assured destruction’’, and ‘‘ecocide’’. These developments shook social
democracy’s idea of the very process of change. Its postwar perception of
change as an evolutionary process towards economic and social progress
was replaced by a fear of the unpredictable nature of change. Moreover,
the economic, political, and cultural changes of the 1960s challenged the
role of social democracy as the agent of change and the carrier of the
future. The future seemed to be slipping out of the hands of social
reformism. This idea of change as ‘‘runaway change’’ that left both the
individual and politics behind was a fundamental element in futures studies
and of socialist interest in them.
For Swedish social democracy, interest in the future originated in other
issues, specific to Swedish political history and the history of the SAP,
particularly the centrality of the welfare state and the concept of a folkhem,
a ‘‘people’s home’’, based on solidarity, equality, and universalism. The
means to achieve the people’s home were first and foremost planning:
planhusha˚llning (economic planning), which laid the foundations for a
democratic mixed economy with welfare as its primary objective, but also
social planning, which during the interwar period expressed itself most
clearly in the social engineering of Alva and her husband – economist
Gunnar Myrdal. This was the Swedish model that Marquis de Childs
described in his famous book of 1932: not Soviet communism, not
American capitalism, but a distinct ‘‘middle way’’.4 Several writers have
pointed to how, from its breakthrough in the 1930s, the notion of the
people’s home was built around a perception of owning the future, of
2. SAP, Ja¨mlikhet (Stockholm, 1969); Tim Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social
Democrats: Through the Welfare State to Revolution (Oxford, 1990).
3. See H.W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea (Chicago, IL, 1987); Robert
Ayres, Turning Point: The End of the Growth Paradigm (London, 1998); Eva Friman, No
Limits: The 20th Century Discourse on Economic Growth (Umea˚, 2002).
4. Marquis de Childs, Sweden, the Middle Way (New Haven, CT, 1936).
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having found that middle way between communism and capitalism, a way
that seemed to offer a unique path forward.5
This sense of owning the future was a strong element in the concept of
the ‘‘Swedish model’’, a concept that gained in popularity in the crisis-
ridden 1960s and 1970s as part of the construction of Nordic particularity
at the very moment this particularity seemed threatened.6 Indeed, from the
late 1960s the people’s home seemed to be increasingly at odds with
change. An increasingly volatile international economy, but also the
rapidly changing political and cultural circumstances of the 1960s and a
threatening world order dominated by the Cold War and the superpowers’
struggle for political and cultural hegemony, led to feelings of vulnerability
and uncertainty about the capacity of the Swedish model to survive. The
Swedish discussion on futures studies began within this discourse of
protecting the folkhem from a future as a social, political, and cultural
other. To this extent, it is tempting to think that, in the Swedish context,
futures studies represented both a kind of high point in the Swedish
model’s particular version of modernity, and a crisis of that modernity, in
the same way that futures studies, as interpreted by the Alva Myrdal
group, came to embody both an extreme idea of social engineering – the
idea of engineering the future in the name of the common good – and a
fundamental critique of the objectivity and technocracy at the basis of
social planning.7
E V I L F U T U R O L O G Y O R T H E W O R K O F M A N – D Y S T O P I A S
A N D U T O P I A S O F F U T U R E S S T U D I E S
The rise of futures studies – or futurology – as an academic field from the
mid 1960s must be placed in the context of other intellectual developments
during that decade.8 The 1960s have often been regarded as an era of
utopias.9 But the utopias of the late 1960s, involving a more equal, a
greener, sexually liberated, and peaceful world organized around the
subject-individual, went hand in hand with rejections of the failed utopias
of modernity, such as the critique of capitalism in Marcuse’s One
5. Ole Waever, ‘‘Nordic Nostalgia, Northern Europe After the Cold War’’, International
Affairs, 68 (1992), pp. 77–102; Lars Tra¨ga˚rdh, ‘‘Welfare State Nationalism, Sweden and the
Spectre of ‘Europe’’’, in Lene Hansen and Ole Weaver (eds), European Integration and National
Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States (London [etc.], 2001).
6. Bo Stra˚th, Folkhemmet mo¨ter Europa (Stockholm, 1992).
7. Idem, ‘‘Nordic Modernity: Origins, Trajectories and Prospects’’, Thesis Eleven, 77 (2004).
8. Wendell Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies: Human Science for a New Era, vol. 1 (New
Brunswick, NJ, 1997).
9. Luisa Passerini, ‘‘‘Utopia’ and Desire’’, Thesis Eleven, February 2002, pp. 11–31; Peter
Wagner, ‘‘The Project of Emancipation and the Possibility of Politics’’, Thesis Eleven, February
2002, pp. 31–46; Giovanni Statera, Death of a Utopia: The Development and Decline of Student
Movements in Europe (New York, 1975).
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Dimensional Man,10 and with dystopias, such as the alarm clock that
triggered the environmentalist movement, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.11
The roots of futures studies lay more in these dystopic narratives of late
modernity than in earlier traditions of utopian thinking, more in night-
mares of imagined catastrophe than in dreams of a desired future.12
In the social sciences, the late 1960s saw a development in which the
postwar emphasis on progress and the technical administering of growth
and social reform was replaced by an emphasis on risk, and hence with the
possibility of predicting and avoiding it. Fundamental to the rise of
futurology and futures studies was the belief that prediction was not a
product of fantasy but a field of reason. The study of the future was based on
the extension of facticity, logic, and rationality into the unobservable
domain of the future, making the risks it posed for humanity controllable, or
at least manipulable. So the future became a sphere of knowledge, politics,
and planning.13 But the discursive field of the future was full of competing
discourses and technologies. The future raised fundamental questions as to
the nature of causality, of what constituted a fact, as well as to an issue of
such concern in the 1960s: the question of the relationship between politics
and knowledge in planning and social reform.14 Moreover, the future was a
field of colonization and permeated by the Cold War.
In the early 1960s, futurology was dominated by the forecasts and
prognoses carried out by industrial think tanks and military interests such
as the Hudson Institute, an American business think tank, which
published The Year 2000, and the RAND Corporation, founded after
World War II by the US Air Force as a research and development
institution. At RAND, the futurologist Herman Kahn developed the
scenario technique, a technique used to construct hypothetical military-
threat situations, and the Delphi method of forecasting, which utilized
expert panel discussions on possible future developments.15 In Europe, the
10. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London, 1964).
11. Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston, MA, [etc.], 1962).
12. In Futures Past Koselleck argued that in the Enlightenment the future became a sphere of
fantasy, a utopia that could only be reached through imagination. In contrast, the rise of the idea
of dystopia in the postwar period coincided with a turn in futures narratives towards narratives
of science and rationality, or a narrative of will in contrast to earlier narratives of the future as
faith, destiny, or teleology. See Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical
Time (London, 1985); Georges Minois, Histoire de l’avenir (Paris, 1996); and Bell, Foundations
of Futures Studies, vol. 2.
13. Bernard Cazes, ‘‘Les reflexions prospectives. Un essai de typologie’’, Futuribles, September
1991, pp. 29–40.
14. On the construction of facticity see Mary Poovey, The History of Modern Fact (Chicago, IL,
1998). On social science and politics see Peter Wagner, Sozialwissenschaften und Staat,
Frankreich, Italien, Deutschland 1870–1980 (Dordrecht, 1990).
15. Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies, vol. 1, pp. 29–38; Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener,
The Year 2000: A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years (New York, 1967).
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Club of Rome emerged from an OECD symposium on forecasting and
planning in 1968. The Club of Rome was an informal network, consisting
of representatives of industry but also of leading statesmen. In 1972 it
published The Limits to Growth, a large-scale computer simulation study
conducted by MIT.16 The Limits to Growth argued that the rapid
industrial development of the postwar period had come to the end, and
that the world was now faced with an end to growth and with the global
consequences of industrial expansion: exhausted global resources, pollu-
tion, and population decline. The Club of Rome emphasized these
problems as the future environment for multinational industry, demanding
that OECD countries take on emerging problems at a global level in order
to ensure the survival of capitalism through long-term planning.17
The politically and intellectually radicalized climate of the late 1960s
influenced a critical futurological reaction that took the form of a critique
of modernity and of existing futurology. In contrast to the technological or
economic basis of futurology, this critique was humanist, rooted in the
social sciences, philosophy, and history. Moreover, it contained a strong
critique of the prevalent concept of progress and of historicist narratives of
change as a linear development over time. Instead, it emphasized the
question of choice and change. The technologies and methods of
futurology, and its bias towards industrial and military interests, were
accused of anti-democratic tendencies, technological determinism, and the
unproblematized extrapolation of trends from present conditions. Its
dystopic elements were said to create self-fulfilling prophecies and feelings
of helplessness by presenting the future as a paved road to destruction.
Two of the chief representatives of this critical futurology were the
Norwegian philosopher Johan Galtung, who coined the term ‘‘chron-
ological imperialism’’ for future visions that extended the values of the
present into the future, thus colonizing future times through the interests
of the present, and the French philosopher Bertrand de Jouvenel. The
publication of de Jouvenel’s book L’art de la conjoncture in 1964
disseminated the terms futures studies and futuribles as distinctive notions
for the critical futures discourse. Futures (plural) highlighted the element
of choice between alternative future visions.18 Critical futures studies were
based on a particular epistemological argument: conjecture was character-
ized by universal uncertainty, but not by complete relativity. The art of
conjecture was a reflexive uncertainty, what might be termed an art of
good guessing, through a systematized analytical process where the
postulates and values of the conjectures were also subject to scrutiny.19
16. Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth (New York, 1976).
17. Ibid.
18. Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture (New York, 1967).
19. Stephan Schwarz, Knowledge and Concepts in Futures Studies (Boulder, CO, 1976).
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Futures studies were therefore not just about producing forecasts and
prognoses; they also had to tackle the analytical processes through which
predictions were made. The futuribles were the variables of future
developments (such as demography or technology), the components of
change, or the ‘‘possible descendants of the present’’.20
From the mid 1960s, futures studies became part of most national
administrations and an element in the competition between East and
West over increasingly sophisticated planning models. In socialist
countries, prognostiks were made part of economic planning. Rocca
describes the fate of the Soviet Forecasting Association.21 Under Stalin it
was grimly repressed; ‘‘anyone who attempted to look too far into the
future was quite summarily brought back to the present’’. Under
Khrushchev it was encouraged, but rapidly reined in when it produced
futures too alternative for the taste of the regime. In Czechoslovakia, the
Prague Spring inspired the founding of a futurological society in explicit
critique of the contemporary scientific and technological revolution. In
the West, the French Commissariat du Plan included economic forecast-
ing, and the autonomous activities of de Jouvenel’s Association Inter-
nationale de Futuribles were supported by the national administration.
This was the context in which the Swedish debate on futures studies
began. Swedish planning in the postwar period was dominated by the
La˚ngtidsutredningen, the economic five-year plan, which was primarily
concerned with labour resources and public-sector expenditure. In
1967, the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (Ingenjo¨rs-
vetenskapsakademin, IVA) suggested creating a Swedish institute for
futures studies, in order to widen planning into new fields and increase
foresight and predictability. The report had a strong bias towards
technological and defence-industry-related interests.22 It was also im-
mediately criticized. In an article in the social-democratic daily Afton-
bladet, a professor of mathematics, Lars Ingelstam (later a member of the
Alva Myrdal group and eventually the director of the first Secretariat for
Futures Studies), argued that futures studies should be based on the public
interest. ‘‘Public interest’’ in this sense meant that futures studies should be
at the service of the social democratic government, for the long-term
creation of a socialist society.23 Futures studies were eventually addressed
in a party report on research in 1975 which stressed the political control
20. Cazes, ‘‘Les reflexions prospectives’’, p. 31.
21. Gordon Rocca, ‘‘‘A Second Party in our Midst’, the History of the Soviet Forecasting
Association’’, Social Studies of Science, 11 (1989), pp. 199–247.
22. Ingenjo¨rsvetenskapsakademin, Ett svenskt institut fo¨r framtidsstudier (Stockholm, 1967).
23. Bjo¨rn Wittrock, Mo¨jligheter och gra¨nser. Framtidsstudier i politik och planering (Stockholm,
1990). In 1971, Ingelstam also wrote a memo called ‘‘Socialdemokraterna och framtidsforsknin-
gen’’ (Social Democracy and Futures Research), Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s
archive, vol. 5: 66f.
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over knowledge of the future.24 But another objection to the IVA report
came from Parliament, where the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) argued that
the public interest of futures studies demanded that they be conducted by
an autonomous research institute, where they would be independent not
only of business interests but also of socialist government planning. A
third objection came from the white-collar trade-union federation, the
TCO (Tja¨nstema¨nnens centralorganisation), which accused the IVA
report of displaying ‘‘meritocratic attitudes’’, and of allowing scientific
expertise to dominate at the expense of democratic interests.25
In 1969, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister, Olof Palme, the
Board of Research (Forskningsberedningen), a body coordinating research
in Sweden, concluded that the study of the future was of direct interest to
public policy. The study of the future was not the art of ‘‘prognosis’’, a
passive and descriptive activity, but a normative activity of ‘‘planning’’, in
the interests of the public good.26 When, on 3 December 1970, he expressed
the government’s intention to appoint a working group for futures studies,
Olof Palme reiterated this outlook on futures studies, seeing them as a tool
for national policy choices and based on Swedish values of neutrality,
independence, and solidarity. If Sweden did not engage in the study of the
future, Palme said, it would be dependent on future visions foreign to
Swedish values. The study of the future was to seek a Swedish path between
two seemingly existing alternatives of the future.
Olof Palme’s personal standpoint in the conflict between futurology
and futures studies is difficult to assess. He did have contacts with
established futurology and the Club of Rome, but he was also involved in
attempts to construct a bridge between the competing future visions of
East and West through the forecasting activities of small, social demo-
cratic, and neutral countries. There is a letter in Alva Myrdal’s archive to
Olof Palme from the secretary of the Board of Research, Arne Engstro¨m,
concerning the Club of Rome’s ‘‘The Predicament of Mankind’’, suggest-
ing that Aurelio Peccei, founder and first President of the Club of Rome
and the Vice-President of Fiat, be invited to Stockholm (as he subsequently
was). The letter also mentions Alexander King, another leading figure of
the Club of Rome, and ongoing discussions between King and the
Austrian leader, Bruno Kreisky, concerning the organization of a
futurology institute based on initiatives by small, neutral, and social
democratic states.27 The institute in question is the Institute for Applied
Systemic Analysis, which was created in Vienna in 1972, with the aim of
24. SAP, Socialdemokratisk politik fo¨r forskning. Fo¨rslag till forskningspolitiskt program
(Stockholm, 1975), pp. 6, 20.
25. Wittrock, Mo¨jligheter och gra¨nser, pp. 35, 39.
26. Memo, 3 February 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5: 066–1.
27. Engstro¨m to Palme, 14 February 1972, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive,
vol. 5: 066–2.
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bridging the differences between the planning doctrines of East and West,
and Kreisky was anxious for Olof Palme to participate.28
The controversial nature of these contacts and of the Club of Rome in
the Swedish context is illustrated in a series of notes in Alva Myrdal’s
archive from Hans Palmstierna, one of Sweden’s first environmentalists.
Most of these notes are to Alva’s husband, the economist Gunnar Myrdal.
In the spring of 1971, Palmstierna wrote to Myrdal about the state of ‘‘the
so-called future research’’:
Dear Gunnar. Sending you a nasty sign of the times. Two gentlemen from this
so-called Rome Club showed up at the Board of Research. They come from
Boston, where they have established some kind of headquarters. One of them is
called Peccei and is the vice president of Fiat. The moral standard is quite clear
when you hear him, after two cocktails, say that it would be best if India were
freed from people [:::] so that other people (white?) could take over. To his mind,
accumulated DDT in Indians would be a great solution [:::]. Palme should never
have let the rabble into the Board of Research. They represent a kind of
sophisticated neofascism [:::].29
And on 5 March 1972, Palmstierna wrote to Myrdal that the Club of
Rome, spreading ‘‘its doctrine like a plague over Europe’’, was having an
obvious influence on Palme.30
However, when Olof Palme appointed the futures studies group on 4
May 1971 he stressed that the role of futures studies was to create an
alternative to ‘‘evil futurology’’ and to increase the scope of the democratic
small state in a world in which the influence of multinational corporations
and the superpowers was growing.31
One must emphasize the obvious risks [:::], not only for developing countries but
also for small states like Sweden, if the study of the future becomes something of
an uncontrolled monopoly for a small number of especially powerful interest
groups. Biased future visions, produced in various ways, can in a dangerous way
induce a public presumption of predetermined development for nations and
peoples, when in reality it is the citizens themselves who can and must decide the
future development of society. Our own study of the future, departing from
democratic objectives and with pronounced demands for international solidarity,
is an important and necessary instrument for us and for the world surrounding
us. In this way, the small state can create a public debate as to what our future
world should be.32
28. Interview with Lars Ingelstam, 20 February 2002.
29. Palmstierna to Myrdal, 13 March 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s
archive, vol.5: 066–2.
30. Palmstierna to Myrdal, 5 March 1972, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive,
vol. 5: 066–2.
31. Statsra˚dsberedningen, ‘‘Pressmeddelande’’, 4 May 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva
Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5:066–1.
32. Ibid.
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‘‘Our own study of the future’’ was not only a question of national survival
but also of presenting the world with a Swedish alternative to the
‘‘uncontrolled monopoly’’ exercised over the future. Palme repeated his
views a year later in a speech to the German trade union IG Metall in
Germany. To Palme, the future was irrevocably the active creation of man.
It was up to living generations to choose the forces that would be
permitted to create the future: technology, profit, solidarity? No-one
could abdicate responsibility for the future by believing blindly either in
dystopic prognoses or in the promise of technology. ‘‘Ob sie nun schlecht
oder gut ist, so ist die Zukunft doch das Eigene Werk des Menschen.’’33 And
for Palme, the fundamental question was, then, not just what the future
would be, but whose future it would be, and in whose interests it would be
shaped.
Alva Myrdal was appointed by Palme to chair the group. The other
participants were all scholars and experts: Martin Fehrm came from the
research bureau of the Swedish military (Fo¨rsvarets forskningsanstalt) and
had been a member of the team that drew up the IVA report in 1969;
Marianne Frankenhaeuser was a professor of psychology, Torsten
Ha¨gerstrand a professor of geography; Lars Ingelstam was Professor of
Mathematics and Planning Theory at the Royal Institute of Technology
(he had already been an active spokesman in the debate following the IVA
report); and Birgitta Ode´n was a professor of history at Lund University.34
C H O O S I N G F U T U R E S
At the first meeting of the group, Alva Myrdal defined the central problem
for Swedish futures studies as being that of how a small state could find its
own model of the future.35 America, once the continent of the future and
the model of progressive politics for the Myrdals, had become a threat to
the future, and the future, Alva Myrdal believed, now lay in the
‘‘fundamental’’ Swedish values of democracy, solidarity, and equality.36
Yesterday [he] gave me a book, Europe in the Year 2000, and it says among other
things that we should consider the American development since they are twenty
years ahead of Europe. I guess this is precisely what we would deny from a
Swedish perspective, that they are twenty years ahead of us and that we should
33. ‘‘Whether for good or bad, the future is still the product of Man himself.’’ Speech by Palme to
IG Metall in Oberhausen, Germany, 11 April 1972, National Archives, Arbetsgruppen fo¨r
framtidsstudier , vol. 5.
34. There was a seventh member, the economist Ingemar Sta˚hl, but he never concluded his work
for the group.
35. The meeting was recorded and there are transcripts of the tapes in the Labour Movements
Archives and the National Archives, Stockholm.
36. The Myrdals travelled to America in the 1930s and wrote enthusiastically on the progressive
character of the New Deal.
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follow their development. [:::]. But this is just the terribly dangerous thing about
most futures studies conducted so far, that precisely because of their techno-
logical focus they shrink the independence of the small state, they tend to reduce
the scope of the democratic Man – the things that we consider our fundamental
values in this country. Therefore I think that areas like democratic participation,
Man as a social creature, the quality of life that the most courageous futures
studies speak of, these are issues that we have to deal with. If we are to think
ourselves towards [forska fram] a future in Sweden which differs from the future
that will follow from sailing with all the others – it should be something really
grand.37
To construct a future of one’s own was indeed a rather grand ambition.
The protocols of the group’s first meeting suggest that its members were
rather overwhelmed by the huge ambitions of their task. An indication of
the sense that they were changing the course of history is evident in the fact
that this first meeting was taped and copies of the tapes placed in the
National Archives.
The way to change history, the primary method of the group, was to
rethink the future based on social science, rationality, and knowledge. The
activities of the group were permeated by the idea that there was such a
thing as the good future, and that this demanded a degree of expertise,
planning, and moulding. Futures studies were explicitly regarded as a tool
for reformism, a tool actively to create and choose the future; ‘‘mould[ing]
the future rather than letting us be moulded by it’’.38 The title of the
group’s final report in 1972 was significant: Att va¨lja framtid [Choosing
Futures], thus emphasizing human will and choice.
The emphasis on a sound knowledge base for planning and policy can be
put into what has often been described as a rationalist Swedish political-
cultural framework, characterized by a strong link between the expertise
of social science and the political values of a social democratic move-
ment.39 But the futures studies group rejected technocratic social
engineering. Futures studies were a kind of public good, and producing
futures was a public responsibility, but also an activity that demanded a
high degree of reflection from the futurists themselves. The group was
highly aware of the problem of defining a particular knowledge and of
using it in constructing the future; it saw a specific tension between
knowledge production and democratic participation. ‘‘I am uneasy at the
prospect of us sitting here like a select group of top scholars, producing our
values and points of view on what the future should consist of’’, confessed
37. Protocol, 18 May 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5: 066–1.
38. Ibid.
39. Katrin Fridjonsdottir, ‘‘Social Science and the Swedish Model: Sociology at the Service of the
Welfare State’’, in P. Wagner, B. Wittrock, and R.P. Whitley (eds), Discourses on Society: The
Shaping of the Social Science Disciplines (Cambridge, 1991); Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic
State (Pittsburgh, PA, 1996).
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the historian Birgitta Ode´n at the group’s first meeting; and Alva Myrdal
expressed her concern in the term ‘‘future dictators’’.40 The fear of
technocratic futures studies led the group to question positivism and its
‘‘myth’’ of objectivity as the scientific framework for futures studies.41
Clearly influenced both by Gunnar Myrdal and the Frankfurt School, they
rejected the idea, dominant both in the social sciences and planning in the
1950s and early 1960s, that futures studies, or any planning activity, were
value-neutral activities based on a rational process of knowledge
accumulation.42 Prognoses were never neutral, and the hidden values of
science, researchers, and planners had to be exposed through public debate.
In fact, values were a ‘‘cardinal question’’ in futures studies; one that had to
be addressed scientifically.43
Rather than defining a particular knowledge about the future, the
group’s use of rationality took the form of an epistemological critique of
existing futurology and the creation of a discourse around the conditions
for the Swedish study of the ‘‘good’’ future. The first step towards this
future was to deconstruct the future, through an analysis of existing
‘‘paralysing’’ future discourses and their influence on the scope for
thinking ‘‘freely’’ about the future.44
Have futures studies been conducted elsewhere in ways that limit our freedom?
Are Swedish companies conducting studies that prevent society from embarking
on futures studies? Can the futures studies of multinational companies interfere
with our scope? What consequences does the planning of foreign governments
have on Swedish conditions? Furthermore, the superpowers and their military
technology are tremendously influential on both technological and social
development. Eventually, there is the possibility that the models that theoretical
futures studies are a part of are of such a character that they limit the scope of our
imagination and thus constrain our perspective on future alternatives.45
To free the Swedish future from the future of others required a number of
conditions, political and epistemological.
First, futures studies should deal with real possibilities of change, by
studying phenomena that could be changed and affected by public
decision-making, not with changes supposed to be beyond the scope of
politics (such as major climate changes or planetary movements).
Similarly, futures studies must not deal with occurrences that could be
40. Protocol, 18 May 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5: 066–1.
41. Birgitta Ode´n, Planering, va¨rdestruktur och demokratisk participation, Ds Ju 1972:27
(Stockholm, 1972), pp. 9, 16, 32.
42. Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research (New York, 1969).
43. Arbetsgruppen fo¨r framtidsstudier, Att va¨lja framtid, SOU 1972:59 (Stockholm, 1972),
p. 12.
44. Myrdal to the members of the futures studies group, 21 August 1971, Labour Movements
Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5: 066–2.
45. Protocol, 18 May 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5: 066–1.
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changed (such as technology) in deterministic ways. The future had to be
about active change.
Secondly, futures studies had to be concerned with the possibility of
‘‘ordinary people’’ to influence the future. This required that futures
studies generate a realistic public discourse on the future, to show the real
limits to the capacity of change: what was possible to change and what was
not. They would have to present knowledge and information in such a way
that citizens could grasp the difference between alternative futures and the
possibility of choice between them. This posed a challenge in several ways.
Many decisions having a great impact on the future were taken outside the
democratic sphere, in industry and business. A large number of decisions
determining the future were taken without reflecting upon their possible
consequences and repercussions in another time or another area. More-
over, the issues at stake in modern society were so complicated that
citizens could not be expected to grasp the reach and scope of the
complexities at hand. The aim of futures studies must therefore be to make
the future democratic, by promoting the participation of citizens and
highlighting alternatives.
Since the production of persuasive futures was ultimately about the
power to change the future, and therefore a possible tool of social conflict,
the futures study group also stated that democratic futures studies had a
particular responsibility to society’s weakest groups. The effects of
decisions on the future for the poor, the elderly, the unemployed, and
the disabled therefore had to be taken into account. This applied
particularly to the very weakest group in society: the unborn. One of
the main reasons for futures studies was, the group agreed, that the
democratic state had a responsibility to represent the interests of future
generations against the interests of the living, since the living did not
necessarily act with the interests of the unborn in mind.46
V A L U E S A N D D E M O C R A T I C P A R T I C I P A T I O N
The group’s interest in the ‘‘cardinal question’’ of values was not only a
matter of critical epistemology, but also of the role of values in the process
of change. This originated in the contemporary impression, strongly
present in the discussions of the group, that the values – growth and
material standards – of the postwar generation had melted into thin air.
The problem of rapidly changing value structures led the group to discuss
historical method for the (as the historian Ode´n put it) twofold question of
values for futures studies: How did values change, and was it possible to
find general patterns behind value change in a way that would permit
46. Arbetsgruppen fo¨r framtidsstudier, Att va¨lja framtid, pp. 11, 13, Wittrock, Mo¨jligheter och
gra¨nser.
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predictions and generalizations of value change? ‘‘Futures studies must
take into consideration the fact that different generations have different
orders of preference, and that rising expectations and new demands follow
every progress. Rapid technological and social changes affect the values of
people, but meanwhile the mechanism of value change is only very
fragmentarily known.’’47
The issue of values had been increasingly addressed in the 1950s and 1960s
within economics and political science, largely in the analysis of preferences
behind consumerist behaviour, but also in Arrow’s social-choice analysis of
preferential systems and of logic in collective decision-making. Ode´n’s
conclusion was that none of these perspectives came close to addressing the
problem of how to predict value change, but that instead systematic
historical analysis might offer a way to find general connections between
phenomena such as technological and demographic change and value
change, in order to understand what seemed to have been revolutionary
changes in values and culture over the past decade. A historical perspective
also implied a critical position on the historicist and evolutionary theories of
change in the 1960s. Ode´n was highly critical of the historicist tendency in
futurology, as well as of the historical writings of Arnold Toynbee.48
But the preoccupation with rapid change also posed a question
regarding continuity. If everything was changing, what could be counted
upon for the future? This question led Ode´n to search for a historical
methodology of distinction between continuity and change, and between
stable and fluctuating structures in the process of change. Which value
changes were quick and volatile, and which were slower, more stable, more
reliable? She came to the slightly disconcerting conclusion that, from a
historical perspective, the values that seemed extremely stable to the
present were actually volatile. Democracy, for instance, had a relatively
short history (just a few hundred years or so), whereas values such as
survival and reproduction seemed genuinely stable. From this perspective,
the ‘‘Swedish’’ values of neutrality, solidarity, and equality seemed less
reliable as cornerstones of the good future.49
Behind the interest of the futures studies group in the mechanisms of
value change, it is difficult not to see Swedish social democracy’s concern
from the 1950s onwards with ideas of a value revolution. A core idea of
Swedish social democracy in the 1950s and 1960s was the notion of
fo¨rva¨ntningarnas missno¨je (literally the ‘‘discontentment of expectation’’),
a metaphor that drew on J.K. Galbraith’s notion of a ‘‘revolution of rising
expectations’’.50 Fo¨rva¨ntningarnas missno¨je was a political slogan that
47. Protocol, 18 May 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 066–1.
48. Ode´n, Planering, va¨rdestruktur och demokratisk participation, pp. 18, 37.
49. Ibid., p. 28.
50. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York, 1964).
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described the ideological problem of growth, which led to new forms of
consumption and demands on public goods such as education or health
care. Ode´n linked the problem of changing demands to Maslow’s
‘‘pyramid’’ of elementary and sophisticated needs, which challenged
politics as the ‘‘elementary’’ values of the postwar generation (values such
as employment and consumption) appeared to be replaced by the
‘‘sophisticated’’ demands of the generation of 1968 for a clean environ-
ment, equality between the sexes, and solidarity with the Third World.51
In Sweden, unlike other European countries, the radicalization of the
late 1960s did not tend to take the form of revolutionary movements, but
rather of a leftist but reformist critique of the SAP. Nonetheless, it was a
critique that, in its radically different idea of the future, took social
democracy aback. Alva Myrdal herself pleaded for a radicalized concept of
equality at the party congress in 1968, stating that the gap in values
between the party and the younger generation had never been wider.52
Part of this critique, which coexisted with more radical criticisms, such as
those by the Vietnam movement FNL or the radical feminist Grupp 8, was
channelled to the environmentalist movement.53 One spectacular event in
Swedish political history was the Almstriden, the ‘‘Battle of the Elm
Trees’’, in 1971: street demonstrations against the felling of trees in the
Stockholm park, Kungstra¨dga˚rden. ‘‘Listen to the humming of the elm
tree, you who make decisions at city hall and in congress. It may be the
future you hear humming there’’, the journalist Kerstin Ane´r wrote in
words that echo Bob Dylan’s song ‘‘The Times They Are A-Changin’’.54
The environmentalist movement also reverberates in the archives of the
Alva Myrdal group. In June 1972, the UN held a conference in Stockholm
on ‘‘The Human Environment’’. The conference attracted large sections of
the international environmentalist movement, which organized a parallel
protest conference – a ‘‘pow-wow’’.55
C O N T I N U O U S W A R ! P O L L U T I O N ! E X P L O I T A T I O N !
G L O B A L E C O C I D E ! I M P E R I A L I S M !
Forced by the intensified discussion of the conditions of life on our limited
planet, the UN is planning a huge conference on the human environment to be
held in Stockholm, Sweden [:::]. While the politicians merely pass endless
51. Ode´n, Planering, va¨rdestruktur och demokratisk participation.
52. SAP, Ja¨mlikhet.
53. Kjell O¨stberg, 1968. Da˚ allt var i ro¨relse (Stockholm, 2002), Christina Florin and Bengt
Nilsson, Something in the Nature of a Bloodless Revolution (Umea˚, 2002).
54. ‘‘Lyss till den almens sus, ni som sitter i stadshus och konselj. Det a¨r kanske framtiden, som
susar da¨r’’; Veckojournalen, 18 May 1971, Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive,
vol. 5: 066i. The song goes ‘‘Come senators, congressmen, Please heed the call [:::]’’; Bob Dylan,
‘‘The Times They Are A-Changin’’ (1964).
55. The term pow-wow is a Native American term referring to a meeting of elders.
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resolutions, we the people have an alternative: we are acting, struggling to create
a new way of life. We are having a POW-WOW! POW-WOW is ACTION –
direct actions, demonstrations, parades, street theatre, exhibitions, leaflets,
bulletins, films, underground comic strips [:::] just whatever your thing is to
help in the struggle to create a new way of life. [:::]. Copy this letter and pass it on
to as many friends and groups as possible. We need thousands of contacts around
the world to make POW-WOW everywhere! [:::]. All power to the Red Indians!
WE’RE ALL RED INDIANS. POW-WOW!56
‘‘Pow-wow’’ was Red Indians, action, and another world. The world of
politics was endless resolutions and an exhausted planet. ‘‘Pow-wow’’ was
an obvious metaphor of a paradise lost, a ‘‘back to the future’’, with its call
for a return to the Red Indians’ harmony with nature and to the absence of
both hierarchy and bureaucracy in decision making around the camp fire.
Rapid value change was a challenge to reformism and planning. Behind
Ode´n’s question on the mechanisms behind value change lurked another
question, never explicitly discussed, probably since it pinpointed the
dilemma of a democratically chosen and pluralistic, but still collectively
‘‘good’’, future: what values were desired for the future, and how could
such desired value changes be protected against other futures?
T H E E L E M E N T A R Y P A R T I C L E O F T H E F U T U R E A N D T H E
L I M I T S O F C H A N G E
The discussions of the psychologist Marianne Frankenhaeuser, the
geographer Torsten Ha¨gerstrand, and the engineer Martin Fehrm mirrored
another of the major issues of the late 1960s and early 1970s: the problems
of the consequences of industrial growth and of a mode of development
where economic and technological progress seemed to threaten the
existence and well-being of mankind. This concerned the very concept
of progress. What was progress? Was it economic growth and GDP, or
human welfare and wellbeing? Was the industrial society, with its demands
on human adaptation to economic values and technological change, really
the good society?
This discussion mirrored the international debate in the late 1960s and
early 1970s on the qualitative aspects of growth and welfare. In 1971 the
OECD published a report that went so far as to question the concept of
growth as the guiding star of international economic planning and
suggested that it be replaced with the concept of ‘‘welfare’’ or ‘‘quality
of life’’.57 From the late 1960s on, international economic and social
planning became increasingly preoccupied with measuring qualitative
welfare factors, with so-called social indicators, and with surveys of living
56. In Labour Movements Archives, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5: 066i.
57. OECD, The Brooks Report (Paris, 1971).
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conditions as measures of progress supplementary to quantitative
economic growth. Pioneering work on social indicators had been carried
out in Sweden by the Committee on Low Income, the La˚ginkomstu-
tredningen. This committee became a source of great ideological turmoil
for Swedish social democrats as it disclosed the existence of modern
poverty in the would-be social paradise of the folkhem, and it was highly
influential in the leftist critique against the SAP.58
The resonance of this ongoing reconceptualization of ‘‘growth’’ as the
hegemonic definition of progress was central especially to the work of
Frankenhaeuser and Ha¨gerstrand. Their aim was to place the human being
and its limits at the centre of the future. Man himself was, as Ha¨gerstrand
wrote, ‘‘the elementary particle’’ of society, the smallest denominator of
change, and its physical, social, and psychological limits were therefore also
the limits to change. In Om en konsistent, Ha¨gerstrand designed what he
called a ‘‘time budget’’, an alternative to the economic budget in national
planning. The core idea of the time budget was that the life cycle of human
beings was the constant in the process of change. A person only had a certain
amount of time to dispose of, and was physically capable of being in only
one place at one time. People not only had to work; they also had to devote
parts of their life to rest, to the care of children, domestic work, and other
things in life. Most of these things were not productive in the conventional
economic sense, but they were essential to both the individual person and to
the existence of society. These time factors were constants in change. To
plan society with a view to the constant expansion of economic productivity
was therefore an anomaly, which meant that the ‘‘particle’’ itself was
constantly stretched and pulled to its limits. Rather than planning on the
basis of such an elastic concept as economic expansion, the fixed entity of
human time should be placed at the centre of planning. Aggregate time – the
whole of the added life cycles of individuals living in society – was the
fundamental resource, and time had real – physical and cognitive – limits
that could not be exceeded without serious social consequences.59
Similar ideas about the individual as the limit of change, and about man’s
capacity to deal with change, were expressed in Frankenhaeuser’s work.
To her, the contemporary debate on quality of life was a reaction against
‘‘competition society’’: a society based on economic values, where
individuals were constantly forced to adapt to rapidly changing techno-
logical and economic structures. Though she was very critical of the
58. Jenny Andersson, Mellan tillva¨xt och trygghet (Uppsala, 2003), forthcoming as Between
Growth and Security (Manchester, 2006).
59. Torsten Ha¨gerstrand, Om en konsistent, individorienterad samha¨llsbeskrivning fo¨r
framtidsstudier, Ds Ju 1972:25 (Stockholm, 1972). See also Ha¨gerstrand’s memo of 29 December
1971, Alva Myrdal’s archive, vol. 5:066 g. The time budget drew upon a school of thought called
time geography, which identifies the cognitive and physical reach of the individual as an
organizing parameter of society’s organization of time and space.
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dystopic narratives of a work like Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock,60 she
argued that it was clear from the behavioural sciences that there was a limit
to the capacity of the human psyche to deal with change. Exposure to over-
or understimulation, in the form of information overload or mechanical
work, caused stress disorders and feelings of helplessness. She argued that
long-term planning had to take into account knowledge from the
behavioural sciences in order to understand and plan for such human
reactions to change.61
A third problem was the question of technology and the relationship
between technological change and social change. When was technology a
good, and when did good technology become an evil? The group argued that
modern technological change differed from historical technological change
in the sense that it was so rapid that, unlike historical innovations, it was not
gradually embedded and socially accepted. Rather, it led to a confrontation
between technology and human-value systems. Futures studies had to
address the connection between innovation and values. Technological
assessment was about assessing the social and human aspects of technology
and emphasizing the moment of choice between technological innovations
that brought with them a certain ‘‘path-driven’’ development, such as
massive investments in infrastructure or specialized technology, invest-
ments that would determine policy choices for a long time.62
C O N S T R U C T I N G A S W E D I S H F U T U R E F R O M A S W E D I S H
P A S T : C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S
The group presented its final report, Att va¨lja framtid, to Olof Palme on 25
August 1972. As a result of the report, a Secretariat for Futures Studies was
set up within the Council of Ministers. Lars Ingelstam became its director.
In its first few years, the Secretariat worked on four futures areas: working
life, energy supply, resources and growth, and Sweden’s place in the world
order. In the aftermath of the oil crises, the energy question became the
central future question, and in 1978 the Secretariat, by then an autonomous
research institute, published a report Sol eller Uran (Sun or Uranium?),63
which attracted much attention. The report discussed the long-term effects
of developing new energy technologies. In the mid-1980s a similar study
dealt with the big future issue of that time, the organization of health
care.64 In recent years, the institute’s focus has been on the future of the
60. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (London, 1970).
61. Marianne Frankenhaeuser, Synpunkter pa˚ forskning om ma¨nniskan i framtiden, Ds Ju
1972:24 (Stockholm, 1972).
62. Ha¨gerstrand, Om en konsistent.
63. Ma˚ns Lo¨nnroth, Solar versus Nuclear: Choosing Energy Futures (Oxford, 1980).
64. Ma˚rten Lagergren, Time to Care (Oxford, 1982).
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Swedish welfare state in the face of the challenges posed by demographic
pressure and the problems of financial sustainability. The institute has also
taken on a number of historians, thus strengthening the link between the
history of the Swedish model and its future.65
The future constructed by the Alva Myrdal group was firmly rooted in
the past achievements of the folkhem. In that respect it was a future vision
strikingly different from the utopias in the history of socialist thought,
which placed the future in the future of socialism.66 To the Alva Myrdal
group, the future was in the past: in the safeguarding of the Swedish model as
the ‘‘good’’ alternative in an ‘‘evil’’ world. As much as they tried to stay clear
of both utopic and dystopic future visions, their utopia took the form of this
middle way between the equally threatening dystopias of the superpowers.
The problem facing the Alva Myrdal group was how to create the good
future. But in the context of the late 1960s and early 1970s creating the
good future was a difficult enterprise. The belief in positivism, science,
technology, and rational planning which informed earlier socialist utopic
conceptions was, in the debates within the Alva Myrdal group, replaced by
the emphasis on democratic pluralism and the recognition of the infinitely
contested nature of the good future. This created a paradox in the group’s
insistence on the existence of the common good, on the one hand, and their
difficulty in defining what this constituted and what means were
acceptable to achieve it. In a way this dilemma illustrates how, in their
claim to extend the horizon of social reformism into that unreachable
continent of the future, futures studies themselves seem indicative both of
a crisis of modernity and enlightenment rationale, and of its high point.
The planning optimism of the early 1970s disappeared with the
economic crisis of that decade and the ideological critique of the welfare
state in the 1980s. Somewhere along the line, the belief in the Swedish
model evaporated. Today, the future seems to be elsewhere – in the Dutch
Miracle or the Celtic Tiger67 – while the folkhem is stuck in history. Along
with this resituating of the future from ‘‘us’’ to ‘‘them’’, the folkhem has
become something of a paradise lost. Evoked in contemporary political
discourse, it is a deeply contradictory image of historical achievement
which serves both as a guiding star for a specifically Swedish future and as
an inherently nostalgic and backwards-looking reference to a glorious
past. Indeed, the nostalgia of a lost future is often referred to by observers
of the sceptic attitudes of the Nordic countries towards a future in the
form of European integration.68
65. Christina Florin and Torbjo¨rn Lundqvist, Historia och framtider (Stockholm, 2003).
66. See Peter Beilharz, Labour’s Utopias (London, 1993); Keith Taylor, The Political Ideas of the
Utopian Socialists (London, 1982).
67. These were the models for the future discussed in a parliamentary report on how to ‘‘turn
around’’ the Swedish welfare state in 2002. Hur go¨r man? Ds 1999:37 (Stockholm, 1999).
68. Waever, ‘‘Nordic Nostalgia’’.
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In the rear-view mirror, the future discourse of the Alva Myrdal group
therefore seems utterly utopic, both in its confidence that the folkhem was
in fact the future, and in the belief in its capacity to create alternatives even,
as in the call for time budgets to be drawn up, to hegemonic conceptions
such as growth and, through rational planning, make them the foundations
of a different future. Utopic, in this sense, is best understood as a future
past, a road not taken and a series of possibilities never explored. Indeed,
many of the key concerns of the Alva Myrdal group – their epistemo-
logical critique of futurology, their insistence on the scope of politics and
democratic choice in creating the future, and their fundamental question-
ing of the notion of progress – are issues that now seem firmly located in
the history of ideas of the 1960s and 1970s and very far from contemporary
political discourses on accelerating change and the urgency of techno-
logical, economic, and social modernization. As a window to a future past,
the history of the Alva Myrdal group might serve to restore a fragment of
utopian thinking to questions that are still essential to our future.
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